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Abstract
While previous empirical literature has examined the effect of founder-CEOs on Þrm perfor-
mance, it has largely ignored the effect of Þrm performance on founder-CEO status. In this
paper, we use instrumental variables methods to better understand the relationship between
founder-CEOs and performance. Using the proportion of the Þrms founders that are dead
and the number of people who founded the company as instruments for founder-CEO status,
we Þnd strong evidence that founder-CEO status is endogenous in performance regressions.
This implies that the direct effect of founder-CEOs on Þrm performance cannot be esti-
mated correctly without accounting for the endogeneity of founder-CEO status. Perhaps
surprisingly, we Þnd that performance is negatively related to the likelihood that founders
retain the CEO title. This result appears to be driven primarily by founder departures after
periods of good performance, rather than by an entrenchment effect that allows founders to
remain as CEOs following poor performance. After factoring out the effect of performance
on founder-CEO status, we Þnd a residual positive correlation between founder-CEO sta-
tus and Þrm performance. This Þnding suggests that there is a positive causal link from
founder-CEOs to Þrm performance.
*Corresponding author: Heitor Almeida, 40 West 4th Street room 9-190, New York NY 10012.
1 Introduction
Founders have unique relationships with their Þrms. Because of their privileged position,
founders may be able to extract higher private beneÞts of control. Founder-CEOs might also
distort investment decisions because they are not well-diversiÞed. As Þrms evolve, founders
may no longer have the necessary expertise to run their companies (Wasserman, 2003), but
they may be unwilling to relinquish control (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). When they do give
up control, they may have a preference for passing it on to potentially underqualiÞed family
members (Pérez-González, 2002). On the other hand, their incentives might be more aligned
with outside shareholders than those of professional managers, not only because founders
usually have high ownership stakes, but also because they might have longer investment
horizons (Stein, 1989). Because they care about their Þrms, they may exert more effort for
a given incentive structure (Palia and Ravid, 2002).
These arguments suggest that the relationship between Þrm performance and founder-
CEO status is different than it is for professional managers. Not only may Þrm performance
be different when the founder is in charge, but performance may also affect founder-CEO
turnover in a different manner than it affects the turnover of professional CEOs. Previous
empirical literature has examined the effect of founder-CEOs on Þrm performance. Man-
agement studies report a positive correlation, a negative effect, or no effect (Jayaraman et
al., 2000). In the Þnance literature, McConaughy et al (1998), Palia and Ravid (2002), An-
derson and Reeb (2003) and Fahlenbrach (2003) report a positive effect of founder-CEOs
on performance. Importantly, none of the above studies directly examines the potential
endogeneity of the status of the founder as the current CEO.1 In fact, previous literature
on founder-CEOs has largely ignored the effect of Þrm performance on founder-CEO sta-
tus. However, there are good reasons to expect that founder-CEO status is endogenous in
a performance regression. For example, because CEOs appear to retain their titles more
frequently when the Þrm is doing well (Warner, Watts and Wruck, 1988; Weisbach, 1988;
Jensen andMurphy, 1990), this might also be true for founders. This argument could explain
the positive correlation between founder-CEOs and performance that some of the previous
studies mentioned above have identiÞed. On the other hand, if founders are entrenched
then it might be difficult to remove them, even following poor performance. This effect
could bias the coefficient on founder-CEO status downward in performance regressions.
1Anderson and Reeb (2003) use Þrm size and risk as instruments for family ownership in some regressions,
but they do not focus speciÞcally on the endogeneity of founder-CEOs status.
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In this paper we attempt to understand the exact nature of the relationship between
founder-CEOs and performance, by fully incorporating the effect of Þrm performance on
founder-CEO status into the empirical analysis. We use instrumental variables methods to
disentangle the effect of founder-CEOs on performance from the effect of performance on
founder-CEO status. Our methodology allows us to identify whether founder-CEOs have
a positive or negative effect on performance, and whether performance has a positive or
negative effect on founder-CEO status.
Our primary sample consists of data on Fortune 500 Þrms over the 1992-1999 period.
Using Tobins Q and ROA as measures of performance, we conÞrm the positive correlation
between founder-CEO status and Þrm performance in OLS regressions that was found
in previous studies. However, we cannot necessarily infer a causal relationship from this
positive correlation. To address the endogeneity problem we need instruments that are
correlated with founder-CEO status but are uncorrelated with performance except through
variables included in the performance regression.
We use two instruments. The Þrst is the proportion of the Þrms founders that are dead.
The second is the number of people who founded the company. Using these instruments,
we Þnd strong evidence that founder-CEO status is endogenous in performance regressions,
which implies that the effect of founder-CEOs cannot be correctly estimated using OLS.
However, after instrumenting for founder-CEO status, we still Þnd evidence consistent with
a positive causal effect of founder-CEOs on Þrm performance. This Þnding corroborates
the suggestion that Þrms led by their founders perform better than other Þrms.
Perhaps surprisingly, the two-stage least squares regressions suggest that after factoring
out the direct effect of founder-CEOs on performance, the remaining correlation between
performance and the likelihood that the founder retains the CEO title is negative. Thus
better performing Þrms are less likely to have a founder as the CEO. This novel Þnding
appears to be inconsistent with the general notion that founder-CEOs will retain their titles
following good performance.
We provide several possible explanations for this Þnding. For example, one possibility
is that the results are explained by an omitted variable measuring the overall quality of
governance: Þrms with bad governance are more likely to perform badly and to have a
founder who is entrenched. Another possibility is that founder-CEOs are more likely to
relinquish control following good performance. To shed further light on this issue, we
examine the effect of past extreme performances on the likelihood that founders retain the
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CEO title. We Þnd that both good and bad past performance increase the probability
that founders step down. Thus we conclude that the negative effect of performance on
founder-CEO status appears to be driven primarily by founder departures after periods of
good performance, rather than by an entrenchment effect that allows founders to remain
as CEOs following poor performance. We conjecture that the effect of good performance
on founder-CEO departures might be due either to a controlled succession effect (Morck,
Shleifer and Vishny, 1989), whereby founders who wish to transfer control to their heirs can
accomplish this more easily following good performance, or more simply to the fact that
founders leave their companies only when they are in good shape (Wasserman, 2003).
We start in section 2 by discussing related literature. In section 3 we describe our
sample, which we use in section 4 to examine OLS regressions of performance on founder-
CEO status. In section 5 we address the endogeneity of founder-CEO status. Section
6 provides further evidence on the causal relationship from performance to founder-CEO
status and section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Literature Review
As we discussed above, other papers provide evidence on the correlation between the status
of the current CEO as a founder of the Þrm and Þrm performance (Jayaraman et al., 2000;
McConaughy et al, 1998; Palia and Ravid, 2002, Anderson and Reeb, 2003, and Fahlenbrach,
2003). None of these studies directly examines the potential endogeneity of the status of
the current CEO. A different approach is taken by Johnson et al. (1985), who analyze the
stock price reaction following the unexpected death of senior corporate executives.2 The
authors Þnd that, while there is little reaction on average to sudden executive deaths, there
is a positive stock price reaction following the sudden death of a corporate founder. Their
suggested interpretation for these results is that corporate founders have higher bargaining
power when bargaining over employment contracts with shareholders, and thus receive a
larger share of proÞts than do professional managers who succeed the founder.
An additional explanation for the Johnson et al. (1985) Þndings is suggested by Schwert
(1985) - the founder effect may be due to the break up of a large control block of stock,
increasing the likelihood of a future corporate control Þght (that generally beneÞt target
shareholders). This idea is also consistent with the results in Slovin and Sushka (1993), who
2Notice that because sudden executive deaths are exogenous events, Johnson et al. (1985) cannot examine
the effect of performance on the likelihood that a founder retains the CEO title, as we do.
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Þnd that the stock price reaction that follows the death of inside blockholders is higher when
the deceased executives equity stake is large. Their result holds irrespective of whether the
executive is a CEO or a founder of the Þrm. In addition, Zingales (1995) reports evidence
consistent with the idea that the death of an executive who owns a lot of stock changes the
strategic value of a vote and increases the premium of voting shares. Thus, the positive
stock price reaction found by Johnson et al. (1985) does not preclude the possibility that
Þrms run by founders perform better than other Þrms.
Our results are also related to the growing literature on family Þrms. Family Þrms in-
clude those that are controlled by their founders, and also by the founders families (Burkart,
Panunzi, and Shleifer, 2003). Anderson and Reeb (2003) empirically identify a family Þrm
as one in which the founding family either continues to have an ownership stake, or has one
of the seats on the board of directors. Their evidence suggests that family Þrms have better
performance than non-family Þrms, both in terms of accounting (ROA, ROE) and market
performance (Tobins Q).3 Because Þrms where the CEO is a founder are by deÞnition
family Þrms, these results are directly related to our results.
However, not all family Þrms are directly managed by their founders. In fact, previous
literature also suggests that not all family Þrms are good performers. Pérez-González (2002)
shows evidence that inherited control by a family member is bad for performance. In his
sample, ROA falls by approximately 20% following the transferal of control to a family heir,
and there is a negative stock price reaction when control is inherited. Morck, Strangeland,
and Yeung (1998) also Þnd a negative correlation between heir control in Canadian Þrms
and Þrm performance. These Þndings raise the possibility that the higher performance of
family Þrms is driven mostly by Þrms where the current CEO is a founder, a hypothesis
which is consistent with the results that we report in this paper, and also with some results
in Anderson and Reeb (2003).4
The literature examining the effect of performance on the likelihood that a founder re-
tains the title of CEO is considerably more sparse. Anderson and Reeb (2003) are concerned
with the possibility that families superior information makes them more likely to exit Þrms
with poor future performance, but they cannot rule it out. In addition, they never attempt
to identify the direct effect of performance on founder-CEO status. One paper that does
3Consistent with a positive effect of families on performance, Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2003) Þnd
that family Þrms face a lower cost of debt than non-family Þrms.
4They show that among all family Þrms, those with founder-CEOs are the only ones to have consistently
higher performance than other Þrms, irrespective of performance metric (market or accounting measures).
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look directly at founder-CEO successions is Wasserman (2003), who uses a sample of 202
small Internet Þrms. Although his sample is very different from ours, his main Þndings
are consistent with ours. A founder-CEOs success in achieving critical milestones such as
a successful completion of product development makes it more likely that a founder will
relinquish the CEO title. Thus, it may be the case that the best performing companies
replace the founder-CEO sooner than the worst performing companies. This is consistent
with our Þnding that good performance makes it more likely that a founder relinquishes
the CEO title. However, Wasserman (2003) does not examine the effect of founder-CEOs
on performance measures.
3 Data Description
Our primary sample consists of data on publicly traded Þrms in the 1998 Fortune 500, ex-
cluding regulated Þnancial Þrms and utilities, during 1992-1999 for which data are available
on ExecuComp (2000). From Standard and Poors ExecuComp (2000) we obtain the names
of the sample Þrms CEOs, CEO ownership and tenure as CEO as well as some Þnancial
information.5 We gather the remaining Þnancial information from Compustat and the date
of the Þrms incorporation from Moodys Industrial Manuals (1999), proxy statements and
annual reports for Þscal 1998. Our Þnal sample consists of 2,128 complete Þrm-years of
data for 321 Þrms during the 1992-1999 time period.
Since ExecuComp (2000) does not contain information on whether the CEO is also a
founder, we deÞne founderCEO in a given year to be 0 if the Þrm was incorporated at least
64 years prior to the current year or if the current CEO joined the company at least 4 years
after the date of the Þrms incorporation.6 For the remaining Þrm-years we checked whether
the current CEO was one of the Þrms founders in a variety of sources consisting of proxy
5In ExecuComp the data item containing the proportional ownership of the CEO is often missing if
ownership is less than 5%. We therefore calculate it as the ratio of the number of shares owned by the CEO
to total shares outstanding after adjusting the number of shares owned by the CEO for stock splits. While
ExecuComp (2000) adjusts the total shares outstanding for stock splits it may not adjust CEO ownership
(as can be seen in the case of CEO Bill Gates of Microsoft whose mean ownership according to ExecuComp
(2000) is 5.5% during 1992-1999, but whose actual mean ownership is 23.6%), however it does include an
adjustment factor (Access item: AJEX) that can be used to adjust ownership. After raising this issue with
Standard and Poors, they changed how ExecuComp reports CEO ownership so that it no longer needs to
be adjusted for stock splits in the later versions of the data. However, all data pulled from earlier versions
still need to be adjusted.
6The longest period of time a CEO has been working for his Þrm in our sample is 59 years. We use
64 years as a cutoff to account for missing data on CEO Þrm tenure. Since most Þrms are founded several
years prior to the date of incorporation this procedure ensures that we check more CEOs than are likely to
be founders.
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statements, annual reports and the internet.7 We set founderCEO in a given year equal to
1 if any source explicitly named the current CEO as a founder or the main executive at the
time the company began (including when it was spun-off).
We use both a market-based measure of performance for our sample Þrms, Tobins Q,
as well as an accounting measure, ROA. We deÞne Tobins Q to be the ratio of the Þrms
market value to its book value. The Þrms market value is calculated as the book value of
assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity. We deÞne ROA to
be the ratio of net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations to its
book value of assets.
In Table 1 we present summary statistics concerning select Þnancial variables and CEO
characteristics. During our sample period a founder was the CEO at some point for 50 of
our sample Þrms (15.6% of Þrms). On the whole a founder was the CEO during 11.1% of
Þrm-years.
4 The Empirical Correlation between Founder-CEOs and Firm
Performance-Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
As a Þrst step in understanding the relationship between founder-CEO status and Þrm
performance, we need to test whether the retention of the CEO title by the founder is cor-
related with Þrm performance in our sample and to check whether our results are consistent
with existing results on the effect of founder-CEOs. Sections 5 and 6, in which we discuss
possible endogeneity problems and causality issues, analyze this relationship in more depth.
Our measures of Þrm performance are Tobins Q and ROA. We use two benchmark
models for performance throughout this paper. The Þrst one postulates that the variable
founderCEO might affect performance along with other Þrm-level characteristics, which are
the log of total assets (a proxy for Þrm size), the log of Þrm age, a measure of stock return
volatility and 2-digit industry dummies (we omit time and Þrm subscripts, and y is the
performance variable):
y = b0 + b1founderCEO + b2 ln (assets)+ b3 ln (Þrm age)+ b4volatility (1)
+industry dummies+ time dummies + u.
7When we could Þnd the name of the Þrms original founders this procedure was straightforward. However,
very few proxies, annual reports or company websites disclosed the names of the original founders. We were
most successful doing a search with the name of the executive and the word founder using the Google search
engine.
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We do not use Þrm Þxed-effects in our speciÞcation because our main explanatory vari-
able (founderCEO) varies little over time for a given Þrm.8 To calculate all t-statistics,
we use heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. In addition, to account for over-time
correlation within the same Þrm, we cluster observations by Þrm.9
In Table 2 we report the results of regression (1) for the two performance measures.
Column I reports the results using logQ as the performance measure,10 and Column III
reports the results using ROA as the performance measure. FounderCEO is signiÞcantly
positively correlated with both logQ and ROA at the 1% signiÞcance level (the p-values
are 0.001 and 0.004, respectively). Of the other three variables, volatility enters with a
signiÞcant negative sign in both regressions, while Þrm size and age have signiÞcant negative
effects only when performance is measured by ROA.
Because it is plausible that founderCEO is correlated with CEO characteristics, it is
possible that our results reßect a spurious correlation between founderCEO and performance
that is due to omitted variables. In our second speciÞcation we therefore include several
CEO characteristics in an attempt to correct for this problem. In particular we identiÞed
three obvious candidates for which founderCEO might be considered a good proxy variable.
The Þrst is CEO ownership: it is likely that founders hold a disproportionately large fraction
of the Þrms equity. It is also reasonable to expect that founders would have long tenures in
the Þrm before leaving the CEO position. Finally, the fraction of the CEOs compensation
which is based on equity may be correlated with founderCEO because of differing pay-for-
performance incentives for founders. Because all three of these variables might also have
direct effects on performance, we add them to our original benchmark model to get:11
y = b0 + b1founderCEO + b2 ln (assets)+ b3 ln (Þrm age)+ b4volatility (2)
+b5CEO ownership+ b6CEO tenure+ b7CEO equity pay
+industry dummies+ time dummies + u.
8 In the context of the ownership literature, Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) argue for the use of
Þrm Þxed effects in regressions which relate ownership to Þrm performance. However, Zhou (2001) points out
that if the explanatory variable changes slowly over time (as do ownership and, in our case, founderCEO),
Þrm Þxed-effect regressions may fail to detect relationships in the data even when they exist.
9Alternative procedures to deal with the group correlation problem lead to virtually identical results.
For example, both averaging all variables over the 1992-1999 period or running year-by-year cross-section
regressions produce estimated effects and standard errors that are very similar to the ones we report.
10We chose a log-linear speciÞcation for Q due to the fact that Q can never be negative. Using Q instead
of logQ as the dependent variable might therefore generate Þtted values that are outside of the range of Q.
11Following Anderson and Reeb (2003), we use the value of CEOs annual option pay divided by the sum
of salary, bonus and option pay to measure a CEOs equity-based pay.
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In Columns II and IV of Table 2 we report the results of regression (2) for the two perfor-
mance measures. Consistent with omitted variable concerns, we Þnd in both speciÞcations
that the coefficients on founderCEO are smaller than those in the previous speciÞcations.
However, founderCEO is still signiÞcantly positively correlated with logQ at the 1% signif-
icance level (the p-value is exactly 0.01) and with ROA at the 10% signiÞcance level (the
p-value is 0.056). CEO ownership is also signiÞcantly positively related to performance,
while CEO equity pay is only signiÞcant in the logQ regression. CEO tenure does not have
a statistically signiÞcant effect on performance.
Taken at face value, what is the economic signiÞcance of these results? It is important
to note that because we are using a log-linear speciÞcation for Q, the marginal effect of
founder-CEOs on Q varies positively with the level of Q. In our sample, the average Q is
2.05. If we take the estimated coefficient on founderCEO from regression (2) as our estimate
of the effect of founder-CEOs on Q, our results suggest that a Þrm with an average Q will
experience a drop of 0.37 units in Q whenever its CEO is not also one of its founders. This
effect is not trivial, but also not too large: it is about one fourth of the sample standard
deviation of Q.
Our OLS estimates of the effects of founder-CEOs on the different measures of Þrm per-
formance are also directly comparable to the ones reported by Anderson and Reeb (2003).
Using a different sample-selection procedure and different empirical models from the ones
we use in this paper, they Þnd that founder-CEOs have a marginal effect on Q of 0.47 units.
While our marginal effect for the average Þrm in our preferred speciÞcation is somewhat
lower (0.37), our log-linear speciÞcation is not directly comparable to theirs, because our
estimated marginal effects are not constant. When we re-estimate our preferred model using
Q instead of logQ as the dependent variable, we obtain an estimated marginal effect of 0.52
(t = 2.30; p-value = 0.022), which is not statistically different from 0.47 at any reasonable
signiÞcance level. Although the log-linear speciÞcation appears to produce more conserva-
tive estimates than the linear speciÞcation, we continue to use our log-linear speciÞcation
for Q because the differences are small. In addition, our maximum likelihood approach in
the next sections requires that, conditional on the right-hand side variables, the dependent
variable should be normally distributed. This assumption may not be unreasonable for
logQ, but it is false by construction for Q.
The similarities between our results and the ones found in Anderson and Reeb (2003)
also extend to accounting measures of performance. They Þnd that founder-CEOs have a
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marginal effect on ROA of 3.14 (when ROA is measured using net income, as in this paper),
an effect that is somewhat larger than the one we report in Column IV of Table 2 (1.75),
but fairly close to the one we report in Column III (2.77). They also use a different proxy
for the return on assets based on EBITDA (earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and
amortization) in their regressions. For comparison, we re-estimated our two benchmark
models using EBITDA instead of net income as the numerator for ROA. Our estimates
for the coefficient on founderCEO are 0.031 (t = 2.35; p-value = 0.01) and 0.026 (t = 1.85;
p-value = 0.064) for the Þrst and second model, respectively, which are quite similar to the
estimate of 0.035 in Anderson and Reeb (2003).12
Overall it appears that the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on the founder-CEO
dummy in a linear performance regression is not very sensitive to the choice of the set of
control variables. Furthermore, survivorship biases do not appear to be a major concern in
such regressions. Anderson and Reebs (2003) procedure of choosing Þrms in the S&P 500
in 1992 and then following them until 1999 introduces a very different type of selection bias
than our approach of choosing the Þrms in the Fortune 500 in 1998 and following them back
in time. Nevertheless, the fact that our estimates are virtually identical to theirs is a signal
that these different types of survivorship biases are not creating a discrepancy between
the two sets of Þndings. Thus the positive relationship between the retention of the CEO
title by one of the founders and both market and accounting measures of Þrm performance
appears to be fairly robust. The important question, to which we turn next, is how should
one interpret this relationship? Should one conclude that the retention of the CEO title
by one of the companys founders leads to superior performance? Or is it the other way
around, that is, is superior performance a reason for a founder to remain as CEO? Or is
it both? To gain further insight into the nature of the relationship between founder-CEOs
and Þrm performance, we will try to disentangle these different effects in the remainder of
the paper.
12Although our results are similar when we use EBITDA instead of net income to construct ROA, it is
easier to detect evidence consistent with the existence of an endogeneity problem using EBITDA. Thus we
choose to use net income instead of EBITDA to be more conservative.
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5 Assessing the Causal Relationships between Founder-CEOs
and Firm Performance
5.1 Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates
In this section we use two-stage least squares methods to try to isolate the effects of founder-
CEOs on performance from other sources of variation. We Þrst discuss the validity of the
two different variables that we use as instruments for founderCEO, which are dead founders
and the number of founders, and then we describe the results of our 2SLS regressions.
Details on the construction of the instruments and their summary statistics are provided in
the Appendix.
 Dead Founders
The Þrst variable we use as an instrument is a dummy variable that takes the value
of 1 if the founder died before the start of our sample period and zero otherwise (if there
are multiple founders, we take the average of this variable among all founders). The mo-
tivation for this instrument is simple: dead founders cannot be CEOs. However, to be a
good instrument dead founders must also be uncorrelated with performance except through
explanatory variables contained in the second stage regression. We Þnd it unlikely that
founders deaths are caused by performance. The death of a founder should be a fairly
exogenous event which will affect the likelihood that the current CEO is one of the founders
but that does not have a plausible direct effect on performance, except when the founder
happens to be the CEO.
 Number of Founders
The second variable we use as an instrument is the number of founders of each Þrm. We
believe that this variable also satisÞes the conditions necessary for a valid instrument. First,
the probability that the current CEO is one of the founders is mechanically increasing in the
number of founders, although since one founder often plays a more dominant role than the
others we expect this correlation to be weaker than in the case of our other instrument.13
13The case of Arrow Electronics illustrates how the number of founders may inßuence whether or not the
current CEO is a founder (see Hoovers 2002, Fortune, January 12, 1981, p. 19 and The New York Times,
December 6, 1980, p. 26). In 1968 three friends led a group of investors in acquiring a then obscure company
called Arrow Electronics Corporation. After merging it with another company, they used it to found what
is now one of the largest distributors of electronic components in the country. One of the partners, Duke
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Second, it should be fairly exogenous in our setup. In particular, the number of founders is
unlikely to have any direct effect on Þrm performance years after the founding event.
Table 3 reports the outcomes of the Þrst-stage regressions of founderCEO on our two
instruments and the other controls from the models (1) and (2). From Table 3 we see
that both proposed instruments are strongly correlated with founderCEO : consistent with
intuition dead founders enters the regressions negatively with t-statistics of −17.16 and
−11.94 in columns I and II, respectively, while the number of founders enters them positively
with t-statistics of 4.10 and 4.66 in columns I and II, respectively.
In Table 4 we report the results of the second-stage regression using model (1) for the
two performance measures. From Columns I and II we see that founderCEO is signiÞcantly
positively related to logQ at the 1% signiÞcance level (the p-values are always lower than
0.001). Similarly, in Columns III and IV we see that founderCEO is signiÞcantly positively
correlated with ROA at the 1% signiÞcance level (the p-values are always lower than 0.004).
These results suggest a causal positive effect of founder-CEOs on performance. Under the
assumption that our instruments are valid, our results suggest that Þrms with founders as
their CEOs appear to perform better than others on average.
Perhaps surprisingly, the 2SLS results are not consistent with the idea that good per-
formance is a reason for a founder to remain as CEO, since all estimated coefficients on
founderCEO are larger when we use 2SLS instead of OLS. Furthermore, the differences
between the 2SLS and the OLS results are statistically signiÞcant. At the bottom of Table
4 we report the differences between the 2SLS and OLS estimates of the effect of founder-
CEOs on performance, along with their t-statistics, which are computed using the method
in Hausmans (1978) speciÞcation tests. We Þnd that all differences are statistically differ-
ent from zero at the 1% signiÞcance level. Thus, under the maintained assumption that the
instruments are valid, this Þnding is consistent with the idea that good performance might
actually reduce the likelihood that a founder retains the CEO title, which explains why the
OLS effects are smaller than the 2SLS effects.
Under the maintained assumption that our instruments are valid, we cannot reject that
there is signiÞcant endogeneity in the one-equation procedures that try to estimate the
Glenn, Jr., was the Chairman and CEO. The other two were Executive Vice-Presidents. In 1980 a hotel
Þre killed 13 members of Arrows senior management including the founder/CEO and another founder. The
remaining founder, John Waddell, was immediately named acting CEO and remained CEO with only brief
interruptions until 1986. Although Waddells primary responsibilities were in corporate administration and
communications before the Þre, the crisis led the board to choose him as acting CEO because he was one of
the original founders.
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effect of founder-CEOs on market and accounting measures of performance. Thus, OLS
procedures that ignore the endogeneity of founder-CEO status in performance regressions,
such as the ones in the previous section, can be potentially misleading because they generate
inconsistent estimates of the economically relevant parameter of interest. In addition, the
larger values of our 2SLS estimates suggest that once one factors out the direct effect of
founder-CEOs on performance that is induced by our instruments, the remaining correlation
between Þrm performance and the likelihood that a founder retains the CEO title is negative.
This result is not consistent with the intuition advanced in several recent studies examining
the effect of founder-CEOs on performance (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Fahlenbrach, 2003),
that good performance should lead founder-CEOs to retain their titles.
If we take the estimated coefficient on founderCEO from the 2SLS regression of model
(2) as our estimate of the effect of founder-CEOs on Q, our results imply that a Þrm with
average Q will experience a drop of 3 units in its Q if its CEO is not also one of its founders.
This effect is almost 10 times larger than the one estimated by OLS. While a negative causal
relationship from performance to founder-CEOs would imply that the OLS estimates of the
effect of founder-CEOs on performance are biased downward, it seems unlikely that the true
effect should be so large. In the next section we therefore investigate whether the extent of
the difference between the OLS and 2SLS results is a result of model misspeciÞcation.
5.2 Endogenous Dummy Variable Model
A puzzling result from the previous subsection is the size of the estimated marginal effect
of founder-CEOs on performance. It is thus natural to ask whether these values are robust
to different econometric procedures: Is there something speciÞc to the 2SLS procedure we
are using that is producing excessively large estimates? Or is the effect of founder-CEOs
on performance really that big?
One noticeable feature of our 2SLS procedure is that, although founderCEO is binary,
in the Þrst-stage regression we ignore the discrete nature of this variable. Two-stage least
squares consistency of the second stage does not hinge on getting the functional form right
in the Þrst stage, so one does not necessarily have to use a discrete dependent variable
model for a dummy endogenous variable (see Angrist and Krueger, 2001). However, 2SLS
leads to biased estimates in Þnite samples and it is not known how misspeciÞcation in the
Þrst stage may affect this bias. Therefore, in this section we jointly estimate a system of
equations in which we explicitly account for the binary nature of founderCEO.
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We formulate the following model:
y = b0 + b1founderCEO +Xβ + u1 (3)
I = Zα+ u2 (4)
founderCEO =
½
1 if I ≥ I∗
0 if I < I∗ (5)
where u1 v N
¡
0,σ2
¢
, u2 v N (0, 1) and corr (u1, u2) = ρ. Equation (3) is the same one
we have estimated by single-equation procedures: the vector of controls X varies depending
on whether we are estimating model (1) or (2). Equation (4) models the determinants of
founders retaining the CEO title. I is an unobservable variable that measures the aggre-
gation of forces that favor retaining a founder as the CEO. The determinants of I are the
observable variables Z that one believes should affect the likelihood that a founder keeps
the CEO title plus an unobserved error u2. Equation (5) is the function that models the
decision to keep a founder as the CEO: founders retain the CEO title if and only if I is
above an (unobservable to the econometrician) threshold level I∗.
The model above is one example of an endogenous dummy variable model (Heckman,
1978). Notice that the correlation between the errors of the two equations allows many
interpretations. For example, if unusually good performance implies that the founder is
more likely to retain the CEO title, we should expect ρ to be positive. We should also expect
ρ to be positive if there is an omitted variable that affects performance and founderCEO
in the same direction. However, the results from the previous section suggest that, once
one factors out the direct effect of founder-CEOs on performance, the remaining correlation
between Þrm performance and the likelihood that a founder retains the CEO title is negative.
This suggests that ρ is negative.
We can estimate the above system of equations by maximum likelihood to get estimates
of all relevant parameters.14 We use dead founders and number of founders as our main
determinants of I in the second equation. The Þrst equation replicates the models (1) or
(2).
Table 5 reports the results for both models and both performance measures. As before,
the direct effect of founderCEO on performance is always positive and signiÞcant at all
conventional signiÞcance levels. It is also true that all estimated coefficients are larger than
their OLS counterparts, which is consistent with the results from the previous subsection.
14This model is identical to the standard average treatment effects model encountered in the program
evaluation literature (see Maddala, 1983, for many examples).
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However, the magnitudes of these effects are no longer so large: for example, the estimates
from column II suggest that a Þrm with average Q will experience a drop of 0.78 units
in its Q when its CEO is not one of its founders. This effect is about twice as large as
the one estimated by OLS but much lower than our 2SLS estimate. We conclude that
the magnitudes of our 2SLS estimates are not robust to changes in model speciÞcation.
However, the evidence that there is a direct positive effect of founder-CEOs on performance
remains overwhelming.
At the bottom of Table 5 we report our estimates of the correlation between the errors of
the two equations, ρ. Consistent with the hypothesis that good performance might reduce
the likelihood that a founder retains the CEO title, we Þnd that ρ is always negative in
all four columns. The estimated correlation between the errors of the two equations also
appears quite sizeable: it is approximately −0.4 in the Q models. Wald tests of the null
that this correlation is zero yield p-values lower than 5% in all four cases, and lower than
1% in three of the four cases. Since testing the null that the correlation coefficient ρ is zero
is an explicit test of the exogeneity of founder-CEO status (under the assumption that the
model is otherwise correctly speciÞed), we reject the null that the two equations in (3) and
(4) are independent in all of our speciÞcations.15
We summarize the results in this section as follows. We conÞrm the previous Þndings
that Þrms that keep one of their founders as their CEOs perform better than the ones that
do not, but the extremely large estimated partial effects of founder-CEOs on performance
that we found in the previous subsection appear to be a feature of our 2SLS speciÞcation.
Most importantly, we again Þnd strong evidence that founder-CEO status is not indepen-
dent of performance, and that once one factors out the direct effect of founder-CEOs on
performance, the remaining correlation between Þrm performance and the likelihood that a
founder retains the CEO title is negative. This is consistent with different interpretations
and we discuss the reasonableness of some of these interpretations in more detail in the next
section.
15 If we construct our proxy for ROA using EBITDA instead of net income, we always reject the null of
independence of equations at the 1% signiÞcance level.
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6 Better Performance Leads to Fewer Founder-CEOs: Addi-
tional Evidence and Possible Explanations
The Þnding that Þrms with relatively good performances are less likely to be run by founder-
CEOs is somewhat surprising, both because the idea that good performance might make
founder-CEOs less likely to relinquish their titles has some intuitive appeal and because of
our evidence of a causal positive effect of founder-CEOs on performance. Thus the purpose
of this section is to uncover some additional empirical relationships that might help us
better understand this Þnding. We Þrst advance some possible explanations for this result
and then we discuss which ones are consistent with our data.
Bad Governance
There is a large amount of evidence showing that poor performance increases the like-
lihood of CEO turnover (e.g., Warner, Watts and Wruck, 1988; Weisbach, 1988; see also
Goldman, Hazarika and Shivdasani, 2003, for a comprehensive list of papers documenting
this relationship). However, in Þrms with entrenched CEOs this link between poor per-
formance and turnover should be weak. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) provide some
evidence of entrenchment of founder-executives. In a sample of Fortune 500 Þrms, they Þnd
that Þrms whose top management teams contain members of the founding-family are less
likely to experience a complete turnover of top executives and are less likely to be targets
of hostile takeovers than other Þrms. However, this type of entrenchment is not sufficient
to explain our Þndings, because it only suggests that poor performance might have a small
positive or no effect on the likelihood of a founder-CEO being replaced. In fact, we need a
stronger notion of bad governance to explain our Þndings: poor performance should decrease
the likelihood of founder-CEO turnover. This could happen if bad governance also has a
direct negative effect on performance. In this case, the negative correlation between the
errors of equations (3) and (4) could be due to an omitted variable measuring the overall
quality of governance: Þrms with bad governance are more likely to perform badly and to
have a founder who is entrenched. Thus, the bad governance hypothesis suggests that poor
performance and the likelihood of replacing a founder-CEO should be negatively related.
According to this hypothesis, however, there is no reason for the CEO to leave the Þrm
after good performance.
Controlled Succession
Suppose that, after good performance, CEOs are more likely to be able to choose their
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successors (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). In fact, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1989)
claim that ordinary CEO successions are more likely to occur after periods of abnormally
good performance. Founders in particular may value the ability to control succession, for it
allows them to transfer control to their heirs. Thus, the controlled succession hypothesis pre-
dicts that founder-CEOs will step out after some period of consistently good performance,
while it has no prediction for how founder-CEO turnover is affected by bad performance.
Founder Benevolence and the Paradox of Entrepreneurial Success
Suppose that founders believe they have superior managerial capabilities (whether this is
actually true is not important for the argument). Suppose also that founders are benevolent,
i.e. they care more about the future of the company than a CEO who is not one of the
original founders. Founders may therefore want to leave their companies only when they
are in good shape. For example, Wasserman (2003) argues that a founder-CEOs success
in achieving critical milestones, such as a successful completion of product development,
makes it more likely that he will step down. He calls this phenomenon the paradox of
entrepreneurial success.
Wealth Effects
Founder-CEOs who have much of their wealth invested in the Þrm beneÞt greatly from
good Þrm performance. If they want to retire when rich, they should be more willing
to retire early following good performance. Thus there should be a positive relationship
between past good performance and the likelihood of subsequent founder-CEO departures.
A related but somewhat darker story is that founder-CEOs might be better informed than
other shareholders and may choose to leave the Þrm and sell their shares when performance
is unusually high. Thus, founder-CEOs may leave their Þrms to cash in before the market
valuation of their shares deteriorates. In both cases wealth effects are important, i.e.
founder-CEOs want to leave their Þrms exactly when their Þrm-related wealth is high.
In order to explore the empirical relevance of these hypotheses,16 we assess how well
16An additional hypothesis that could be consistent with our Þnding is what might be called a CEO
Manipulation of Earnings and Short-Horizon problem. When CEOs are approaching the date when they
expect to depart from a Þrm, a horizon problem arises. Because they will not be around to collect the
beneÞts of long-term investments, they might have an incentive to cut expenses prior to expected departures
in order to boost earnings, which might be positively linked to CEO pay. This effect would cause accounting
measures of performance to be artiÞcially high right before CEO turnover. We do not explicitly analyze
this hypothesis here, because previous evidence on this topic leads us to believe that it is unlikely that this
effect is driving our results. For example, Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) Þnd little evidence supporting the
short-horizon problem. In fact, they Þnd that while there might be some evidence that managers take actions
that increase accounting earnings prior to CEO departures, these cases are restricted to poorly performing
Þrms, implying that this effect is more likely to be associated with poor governance in general.
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past performances, both good and bad, help predict future changes in command in which
a founder-CEO steps out. Thus we use the timing of events as an identiÞcation strategy.
There are two main limitations of this procedure. First, predictive power does not imply
causation, especially when variables reßect the behavior of forward-looking agents. Thus,
we expect market measures of performance to be more plagued by endogeneity problems in
predictive regressions than accounting measures, because the latter tend to be less inßuenced
by the expectation of future events. Second, and perhaps most importantly, our tests in the
previous sections detected a negative contemporaneous effect of performance on founder-
CEO status. To the extent that performance exhibits some persistence, our approach in this
section should be able to shed some light on the causes of this effect. However, one cannot
fully capture this effect without accounting for its strictly contemporaneous component, for
which identiÞcation by means of timing is not feasible.
Our empirical strategy is as follows. When a CEO who is not a founder is replaced,
this typically (though not necessarily) implies that the new CEO is also a non-founder.
Therefore, turnover data in Þrms which are not initially run by founders are not useful for
our purposes. Accordingly, we restrict our sample to Þrms that were run by one of their
founders in any year in our sample. We then generate an indicator variable called stepout
that takes the value of 1 in the Þrm-years in which a founder-CEO steps out and 0 otherwise.
For each Þrm that has experienced a change of command in this restricted sample, we leave
out all observations in the years after the one in which the founder has relinquished the CEO
title. This sample selection procedure severely reduces the number of usable observations.
We therefore expanded our sample to increase the number of changes in command for
founder-CEOs. To do this we used Forbes executive compensation surveys (Forbes, 1992-
1999), which identify whether or not the CEOs of the Forbes 800 are founders. We Þrst
matched ExecuComp to the Forbes 800 Þrms to identify further instances of Þrms whose
founders were CEOs. We then tracked these additional Þrms in the Forbes compensation
surveys until 2001 to identify when the founder no longer held the CEO title. By this
procedure we were able to expand our sample of founder-CEO departures from 23 to 50.
We also identiÞed 535 Þrm-years in which stepout is equal to zero. We obtain performance
measures and other controls, such as total assets, volatility, CEO ownership, and CEO
tenure, from ExecuComp for the additional Þrm-years.
The theories we have outlined have predictions for how founder-CEO departures should
be differentially affected by either good or bad past performance. Thus, in principle the
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relationship between performance and the likelihood of founder-CEO departures is poten-
tially non-monotonic. In order to jointly test some of these hypotheses, we have to impose
some empirical speciÞcations that allow for the possibility of a non-monotonic relationship
between the dependent and independent variables.
A simple and intuitive procedure that is well suited for our purposes is as follows. We
create a dummy variable called highQ that equals 1 for very high values of lagged Q and
is zero otherwise. We consider Q to be high if it is in the top quartile of the full sample
Q distribution for that given year. Similarly, we create a dummy variable called lowQ that
equals 1 whenever Q is in the bottom quartile of the full sample Q distribution for that
given year, and is zero otherwise. The variables highROA and lowROA are deÞned in an
analogous way. Because we want to see the effects of persistent past performance on CEO
turnover, we use the averages of one- and two-year lagged Q and ROA to construct our
measures of extreme performance.17 Theses variables partially capture the relative nature
of performance, that is, how the Þrm is performing in relation to others.18
Table 6 presents the results of Probits estimating the likelihood of a founder-CEO
stepping out as a function of highQ and lowQ and year dummies, and also as a function
of highROA and lowROA and year dummies. As one can see from column I, we Þnd that
the estimated coefficients on highQ and lowQ are both positive but not signiÞcant. From
column II, however, we Þnd that both highROA and lowROA help predict future changes
in which a founder-CEO steps out.
The lack of predictive power of Q is not surprising. It is a well established fact in the
CEO turnover literature that accounting measures of performance are better predictors of
turnover than market measures (Weisbach, 1988; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993). In fact,
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) claim that this is exactly what theory predicts: accounting
measures of performance reßect the characteristics of current managers, while stock market
based measures of performance should also reßect the expectation of future management
changes.
The Þnding that past poor performance as measured by ROA increases the likelihood
that a founder-CEO will leave the Þrm is at odds with the bad governance hypothesis. This
result is not surprising, given the well-documented evidence on the disciplining role of CEO
17We chose two years because using three or more years would severely restrict our sample size.
18Changing the comparison group appears to have only minimal effects on these variables. For example,
in earlier versions of this paper we have used the full sample (1992-1999) as the comparison group, and the
results were almost exactly identical.
18
dismissals (Warner, Watts and Wruck, 1988; Weisbach, 1988). What our evidence adds to
this literature is the conÞrmation that founders are not immune to this disciplining device.
On the other hand, the Þnding that past good performance as measured by ROA in-
creases the likelihood that a founder-CEO will leave the Þrm in the near future is consistent
with the other three hypotheses: controlled succession, founder benevolence and wealth
effects.
Before we try to further discriminate among these hypotheses, we brießy consider some
robustness checks. First, our choice of cutoff (25%) to deÞne both high and low performance
is not important. Choosing any cutoff in the range of 10% to 35% always leads to estimated
parameters that are signiÞcant at least at the 10% level in the ROA speciÞcation. As
expected, as the cutoff approaches 50% the effects become much weaker and eventually
not signiÞcant. For cutoffs lower than 10%, the standard errors tend to go up, which is
consistent with the intuition that the precision of our estimates should decrease as the
number of Þrms that are considered to be performing extremely well or extremely badly
decreases.
We also experimented with including other controls in our speciÞcations (not reported
in the tables). Firm-level controls do not have signiÞcant effects on the probability of a
founder-CEO departure. For example, Þrm size (proxied by the log of total assets) and
volatility have no signiÞcant effect on founder-CEO departures. Their inclusion also does
not change the signiÞcance of the results reported in Table 6. On the other hand, CEO
tenure and CEO age do have signiÞcant effects on founder-CEO departures, but again they
have minimal impact on the estimated effects of both bad and good performance on CEO
departures.
As a Þnal robustness check, we also tried a more ßexible speciÞcation that is capable of
capturing richer non-monotonic relationships between performance and the probability of
CEO departures. For each performance measure, we created two new variables: we interact
both the high and the low performance dummies with the average of one- and two-year
lagged performance. We estimate Probits using both the dummies and the interaction terms.
This speciÞcation allows us to capture the additional effect that, for example, performance
has on founder-CEO departures conditional on performance being high. It also allow us to
better explore the continuous nature of the underlying performance variables. We report
the results of these extended speciÞcations in columns III and IV of Table 6. We see
that the signiÞcance of the effects of both the low and high performance dummies is not
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affected by the inclusion of the interaction terms. Furthermore, these interaction terms
appear to have no additional predictive power. This suggests that our original simpler
speciÞcation is capturing most of the effects of performance on the likelihood of founder-
CEO departures, consistent with previous evidence that the performance-CEO turnover
relationship is characterized by threshold effects (e.g. Goldman, Hazarika and Shivdasani,
2003).
To further discriminate among our hypotheses, we examine the importance of wealth
effects in Table 7.19 If wealth effects are important determinants of founder-CEO departures,
one should expect that founder-CEOs with more Þrm-related wealth leave more often. In
column I, we see that the opposite holds: founder-CEOs with higher ownership stakes are
less likely to leave the Þrm. Of course, ownership may affect the likelihood of departure
for reasons that are not related to CEO wealth. For example, CEOs with more ownership
might be more entrenched and thus less likely to be forced to leave. Strictly speaking,
wealth effects should play a role only when CEOs are departing after good performance. To
test this hypothesis more directly, we create a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if
founder-CEO ownership is high and 0 otherwise. We deÞne high ownership as an above-
average equity stake (the average ownership of founder-CEOs in our sample is approximately
5%). We then interact the high ownership dummy with both highROA and lowROA. If
founder-CEOs are departing after periods of good performance due to wealth effects, then
we should expect that the sensitivity of departure to good performance should be higher
when they have more ownership. Thus, we expect the interaction between highROA and
highOWNERSHIP to have a positive effect on the probability of CEO departure. From
column II, we see that this interaction term actually enters with a negative sign and is
not signiÞcantly different from zero. Overall, we Þnd no support for the hypothesis that
wealth effects are responsible for the positive correlation between high performance and
founder-CEO departures in our sample.
Our conclusions are as follows. The Þnding that Þrms with relatively good performances
are less likely to be run by founder-CEOs appear to be due more to founders choosing to
relinquish control after periods of good performance than to an omitted variable correlated
with bad governance. In addition, our evidence suggests that wealth-effects are not driving
our results. This implies that the hypotheses most consistent with our evidence are the
19We only report results using ROA. As before, the regressions using Q suggest similar results, but they
are never signiÞcant.
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controlled-succession and the founder-benevolence hypotheses.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we provide strong evidence that founder-CEO status is inßuenced by Þrm
performance. This implies that the direct effect of founder-CEOs on Þrm performance can-
not be estimated correctly without accounting for the endogeneity of founder-CEO status.
Positive effects of founder-CEOs on performance and valuation have been documented by
Jayraman et al (2000), Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), Anderson and Reeb (2003), and
Fahlenbrach (2003). Using methods based on instrumental variables, we conÞrm these Þnd-
ings and identify the direction of reverse causality. Perhaps surprisingly, we Þnd that Þrm
performance has a negative effect on the likelihood that a Þrm is run by one of its founders.
This result is not sensitive to model speciÞcation, to alternative measures of performance,
or to econometric procedures.
In order to further understand this negative effect of performance on founder-CEO sta-
tus, we estimate the probability of founder-CEO departures as a (potentially non-monotonic)
function of past performance. Our main Þnding is that past superior accounting perfor-
mance increases the likelihood that founder-CEOs will step out. Our evidence is not con-
sistent with the hypothesis that an omitted variable correlated with bad governance can
explain the negative relationship between Þrm performance and founder-CEO status nor
with the hypothesis that founder-CEOs leave once they are wealthy enough. This leaves us
with two potential arguments that might explain our new Þnding: (1) founder-CEOs may
value control over their succession more than non-founders, and (2) founder-CEOs may
want to leave their companies in good shape.
Our paper has implications for the growing literature on family Þrms. The positive
effect of founders on performance suggests that the higher performance of family Þrms
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003) could be driven primarily by Þrms where the current CEO is a
founder. Thus, there might be signiÞcant distinctions between founder control and family
control. In addition, the Þnding that Þrms with relatively good performances are less likely
to be run by founder-CEOs may help explain the negative correlation between inherited
control and performance (e.g. Pérez-González, 2002). If performance is mean reverting
and founders leave at its peak, one should observe a decline in performance when founders
transfer control to their heirs even when inherited control is not bad for performance. This
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interpretation is most likely to be true if founders value the ability to transfer control to
their heirs, because in this case high performance might make it easier for founders to
control succession. Our results suggest that studying the differences between founder-CEO
succession and the succession of professional CEOs should provide interesting topics for
future research.
8 Appendix - Construction of Instruments
In this section we discuss the construction of the instruments for the dummy variable
founderCEO indicating whether or not the CEO is also one of the companys founders. As
we discussed in section 5, we use two instruments for this dummy. The Þrst is the proportion
of a companys founders who are dead prior to the time our data starts (1992). The second
is the number of founders of the company.
We collected the data necessary to construct the instruments from a variety of sources
using Lexis-Nexis as well as the International Directory of Company Histories (various
volumes) and company histories on company websites when available. In order to determine
who the founders of the Þrms in our sample are, we Þrst had to establish what the founding
event of the Þrm in its form in which it appears in 1998 was (since our Þrms are taken from
the 1998 Fortune 500 list). We consider the following four types of events to be founding
events: a simple business start-up (e.g. a shop opening), a merger of equals, a spin-off of a
division that was not previously a separate company that had been acquired and a major
change in ownership, e.g. an LBO, MBO or other acquisition, that leads to a major change
in the development of the company. In the case of a merger of equals, we consider the
founders of the new company to be the founders of both Þrms that are merging. In the
case of a spin-off we consider the founders to be the founders of the original company, as
well as the CEO at the time of the spin-off if he appears important to the development of
the company. If a company was acquired and spun-off again, we consider the founders to
be the founders of the company pre spin-off. We also generally consider any person to be
a founder of the company who is identiÞed as such in any of our data sources. In some
cases our sources also identify important investors in the company or the Þrst CEO who
was hired by a founder as founders.
Our procedure was to use the company descriptions in the International Directory of
Company Histories and the histories of the companies in Hoovers Company ProÞle Data-
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base, as well as information on the founders of the 1992 Fortune 200 Þrms in the National
Commission on Entrepreneurships (2001) study on entrepreneurs as a starting point for
identifying the founding event, and if possible, the names of the founders. This procedure
worked better for Þrms that were founded recently than for older Þrms that had undergone
several mergers or restructurings. Generally older Þrms tended to have company histo-
ries on their websites that we could use to identify what the Þrm considers to be its main
founding event. Once we identiÞed the founding events, we searched archived stories from
the sources Forbes, Fortune and U.S. News on Lexis-Nexis for further information on the
founders of the company and information on whether or not the founders died prior to 1992
and the year the founders died. We consider a founder to be alive after 1992 when we could
either verify that he was alive after 1992 or we could not Þnd an obituary for the founder
and the founder is mentioned in news articles as playing an important role in the company
after 1975. If we are unable to Þnd the name of a founder, we consider him to be alive if
most of the other founders are alive. Otherwise, we consider a founder to be dead. When we
were unable to Þnd the necessary information on Lexis-Nexis, we searched for the founders
using Forbes Peopletracker and the internet.
Our Þnal data set consists of 580 observations on founders for 321 Þrms in our sample.
Our instruments are a straightforward per-Þrm average of the dummy indicating whether
the founder died prior to 1992 and the per-Þrm sum of all founders.
To reduce data collection costs, we did not collect data on founders for a random sample
of 63 Þrms that had been incorporated more than 64 years prior to 1992 out of these 321
Þrms. For these Þrms we assume that there was only one founder and that the founder
died prior to 1992. Since it is highly likely that the founders of these Þrms all died prior
to 1992 and the probability that any of the founders are the CEO in 1994 is very low, we
do not expect this shortcut to affect our results. Similarly, when the parties involved in a
merger of equals themselves were the product of mergers of equals, we consider the Þrm to
have two founders who died prior to 1992. Since these Þrms were all older Þrms and the
inßuence of the original founders of each component Þrm is likely to be very small after
several restructurings, this coding is consistent with the fact that it is highly unlikely that
any of the founders is the CEO in 1994.
Of the 258 Þrms for which we collected detailed founder data, most were founded by
simple business start-ups. Approximately 21 Þrms were founded through mergers of equals
and 13 were founded as the result of a spin-off. The average number of founders in our
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sample is 1.8 with a standard deviation of 1.1 and a maximum of 8 founders. 50% of the
Þrms were founded prior to 1961. This is reßected in the fact that the average proportion
of founders who died prior to 1992 is 70.3% with a standard deviation of 43.5%.
References
[1] Anderson, R., and D. Reeb, 2003, Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance:
Evidence from the S&P 500, Journal of Finance, 58, 1301-1328.
[2] Anderson, R., S. Mansi, and D. Reeb, 2003, Founding-Family Ownership and the
Agency Cost of Debt, Journal of Financial Economics, 68, 263-285.
[3] Angrist, J., and A. Krueger, 2001, Instrumental Variables and the Search for Iden-
tiÞcation: From Supply and Demand to Natural Experiments, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 15, 69-87.
[4] Burkart, M., F. Panunzi, and A. Shleifer, 2003, Family Firms, Journal of Finance,
58, 2167-2201.
[5] Fahlenbrach, R., Founder-CEOs and Stock Market Performance, working paper,
Wharton School.
[6] Goldman, E., S. Hazarika, and A. Shivdasani, 2003, What Determines CEO
Turnover?, working paper, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill.
[7] Hausman, J. A., 1978, SpeciÞcation Tests in Econometrics, Econometrica, 46, 1251-
1271.
[8] Heckman, J. J., 1978, Dummy Endogenous Variables in a Simultaneous Equations
System, Econometrica, 46, 931-960.
[9] Hermalin, B. E., and M. S. Weisbach, 1998, Endogenously Chosen Boards or Directors
and Their Monitoring of the CEO, American Economic Review, 88, 96-118.
[10] Himmelberg, C., G. Hubbard, and D. Palia, 1999, Understanding the Determinants
of Managerial Ownership and the Link between Ownership and Performance, Journal
of Financial Economics, 53, 353-84.
[11] International Directory of Company Histories, 1988-2001, St. James Press, Chicago.
24
[12] Jayaraman, N., A. Khorana, E. Nelling, and J. Covin, 2000, CEO-Founder Status and
Firm Financial Performance, Strategic Management Journal, 21, 1215-1224.
[13] Jensen, M., and K. J. Murphy, 1990, Performance Pay and Top Management Incen-
tives, Journal of Political Economy, 98, 225-264.
[14] Johnson, B., R. Magee, N. Nagarajan, and H. Newman, 1985, An Analysis of the Stock
Price Reaction to Sudden Executive Deaths, Journal of Accounting and Economics,
7, 151-174.
[15] Maddala, G. S., 1983, Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics.
Econometric Society Monographs, Cambridge University Press.
[16] McConaughy, D., M. Walker, G. Henderson, and C. Mishra, 1998, Founding Family
Controlled Firms: Efficiency and Value, Review of Financial Economics, 7, 1-19.
[17] Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, 1989, Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate
Control, American Economic Review, 79, 842-852.
[18] Morck, R., D. Strangeland, and B. Yeung, 1998, Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control
and Economic Growth: a Canadian Disease?, NBER Working paper, no. 6814.
[19] Murphy, K. J., and J. L. Zimmerman, 1993, Financial Performance Surrounding CEO
Turnover, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 16, 273-315.
[20] National Commission on Entrepreneurship, 2001, From the Garage to the Boardroom:
The Entrepreneurial Roots of Americas Largest Corporations, report.
[21] Palia, D., and A. Ravid, 2002, The Role of Founders in Large Companies: Entrench-
ment or Valuable Human Capital, working paper, Rutgers University.
[22] Pérez-González, F., 2002, Inherited Control and Firm Performance, working paper,
Columbia Business School.
[23] Schwert, B., 1985, A Discussion of CEO Deaths and the Reaction of Stock Prices,
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7, 175-178.
[24] Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny, 1989, Managerial Entrenchment: The Case of Manager-
SpeciÞc Investments, Journal of Financial Economics, 25, 123-139.
25
[25] Slovin, M., and M. Sushka, 1993, Ownership Concentration, Corporate Control Ac-
tivity, and Firm Value: Evidence From the Death of Large Blockholders, Journal of
Finance, 48, 1293-1321.
[26] Stein, J. 1989, Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Cor-
porate Behavior, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, 655-669.
[27] Warner, Jerold B., Watts, Ross L., and Karen H. Wruck, 1988, Stock Prices and Top
Management Changes, Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 461492.
[28] Wasserman, N., 2003, Founder-CEO Succession and the Paradox of Entrepreneurial
Success, Organization Science, 14, 149-172.
[29] Weisbach, M. S., 1988, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, Journal of Financial
Economics, 20, 431-460.
[30] Zhou, X., 2001, Understanding the Determination of Managerial Ownership and its
Relationship to Firm Performance, Journal of Financial Economics, 62, 559-71.
[31] Zingales, L., 1995, What Determines the Value of Corporate Votes, Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 110, 1047-1073.
26
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Sample consists of 321 publicly traded, non-regulated Þrms from the 1998 Fortune 500
that were available on ExecuComp (2000) during the years 1992-1999. Most Þnancial
and CEO data are from ExecuComp (2000). Firm age is collected from Moodys
Manuals (1999), proxy statements and 10-Ks for Þscal 1998. Founder data are from
a variety of sources consisting of proxy statements, annual reports and the internet.
Our proxy for Tobins Q is = (book value of assets-book value of equity + market
value of equity)/book value of assets. ROA = net income before extraordinary items
and discontinued operations/book value of assets. FounderCEO is equal to one if
the CEO is a founder of the company. CEO ownership is deÞned as the ratio of
the number of shares owned by the CEO after adjusting for stock splits to total
shares outstanding. CEO tenure is the number of years since the CEO was appointed
CEO. CEO equity-based pay is the value of annual option pay divided by the sum
of salary, bonus and annual option pay. V olatility is the Black-Scholes volatility as
reported in ExecuComp. Firm age is the number of years since the Þrms Þrst date
of incorporation.
Variable
Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. No. Obs.
Q 2.05 1.40 0.83 19.16 2128
logQ 0.59 0.46 −0.18 2.95 2128
ROA 5.68 5.75 −48.19 48.15 2128
FounderCEO 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 2128
CEO ownership 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.44 2128
CEO tenure 7.36 7.24 0.00 47.00 2128
CEO equity-based pay 0.47 0.29 0.00 1.00 2128
Volatility 0.29 0.11 0.12 1.05 2128
Firm assets (log) 8.72 1.07 5.78 12.91 2128
Firm age (log) 3.82 0.89 0.00 4.98 2128
Table 2: OLS Regressions of Firm Performance on Founder-CEO Status
This table reports results of regressing Þrm performance (measured alternatively by
logQ and ROA) on founder-CEO status. Columns I and II report results using logQ
as the performance measure. Columns III and IV report results using ROA. For each
performance measure, we estimate the empirical model in equations (1) and (2) in the
text using OLS. All data is described in Table 1. The estimation period is 1992-1999.
All regressions include year effects and 2-digit SIC industry dummies. The estimations
correct the error structure for heteroskedasdicity and within-Þrm correlation using the
Huber-White estimator. t-stats (in parentheses).
Dependent Variable
logQ ROA
Indep. Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV)
FounderCEO 0.242*** 0.185*** 2.770*** 1.751*
(3.31) (2.58) (2.91) (1.91)
ln(assets) −0.025 −0.026 −0.519** −0.470**
(−1.12) (−1.18) (−2.19) (−2.03)
ln(age) −0.037 −0.038 −0.471 −0.479*
(−1.29) (−1.33) (−1.59) (−1.66)
V olatility −0.858*** −0.932*** −16.217*** −16.988***
(−4.62) (−5.13) (−6.96) (−7.50)
CEO ownership . 1.327*** . 20.085***
(2.81) (3.24)
CEO tenure . −0.002 . −0.012
(−0.68) (−0.45)
CEO equity pay . 0.159*** . 0.955
(3.01) (1.570)
Observations 2128 2128 2128 2128
Adj-R2 0.30 0.32 0.19 0.20
***,**,* indicate statistical signiÞcance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Table 3: 2SLS Regressions of Firm Performance on Founder-CEO Status:
First Stage
This table reports the Þrst-stage of the two-stage least squares regressions relating
Þrm performance to founder-CEO status for both models (1) and (2) in the text.
We instrument founderCEO using dead founders and number of founders. Dead
founders is the average of an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a given
founder is dead as of 1992 and zero otherwise. Number of founders is the total
number of founders for each Þrm. Details on the construction of the instruments are
provided in the Appendix. All other data is described in Table 1. The estimation
period is 1992-1999. All regressions include year effects and 2-digit SIC industry
dummies. t-stats (in parentheses).
Dependent Variable:
FounderCEO
Indep. Variables (I) (II)
Dead founders −0.293*** −0.190***
(−17.16) (−11.94)
Number of founders 0.022*** 0.022***
(4.10) (4.66)
ln(assets) −0.007 0.006
(−1.11) (1.09)
ln(age) −0.500*** −0.061***
(−6.36) (−8.62)
V olatility 0.183*** 0.249***
(2.83) (4.23)
CEO ownership . 1.299***
(10.39)
CEO tenure . 0.012***
(15.53)
CEO equity pay . 0.030*
(1.69)
Observations 2128 2128
Adj-R2 0.40 0.52
***,**,* indicate statistical signiÞcance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Table 4: 2SLS Regressions of Firm Performance on Founder-CEO Status:
Second Stage
This table reports results of regressing Þrm performance (measured alternatively by
logQ and ROA) on FounderCEO status. FounderCEO is instrumented with dead
founders and number of founders. The Þrst stage regressions are reported in Table
3. Columns I and II report results using logQ as the performance measure. Columns
III and IV report results using ROA. For each performance measure, we estimate the
empirical model in equations (1) and (2) in the text. All data is described in Table 1
and the Appendix. The estimation period is 1992-1999. All regressions include year
effects and 2-digit SIC industry dummies. The estimations correct the error structure
for heteroskedasdicity and within-Þrm correlation using the Huber-White estimator.
The bottom row of this Table reports an estimate of the difference between the IV
and the OLS coefficients on the founderCEO variable, computed using a Hausman
(1978) speciÞcation test. t-stats (in parentheses).
Dependent Variable
logQ ROA
Indep. Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV)
FounderCEO 1.096*** 1.485*** 8.998*** 10.843***
(4.33) (3.63) (3.81) (2.95)
ln(assets) −0.100 −0.028 −0.410* −0.490**
(−0.41) (−1.08) (−1.73) (−1.96)
ln(age) 0.052 0.087** 0.177 0.396
(1.52) (2.05) (0.53) (1.01)
V olatility −1.196*** −1.443*** −18.687*** −20.558***
(−4.53) (−4.44) (−6.86) (−6.70)
CEO ownership . −0.547 . 6.981
(−0.56) (0.77)
CEO tenure . −0.020*** . −0.141**
(−3.21) (−2.39)
CEO equity pay . 0.100 . 0.543
(1.52) (0.78)
Observations 2128 2128 2128 2128
Diff. IV - OLS 0.854*** 1.300*** 6.230*** 9.093***
(8.883) (7.948) (5.345) (4.861)
***,**,* indicate statistical signiÞcance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Table 5: Firm Performance and Founder-CEO Status: Results From Endoge-
nous Dummy Variable Model
This table reports results of regressing Þrm performance (measured alternatively by
logQ and ROA) on founder-CEO status. FounderCEO is instrumented with dead
founders and number of founders. The estimation method takes the discrete nature
of founderCEO explicitly into account. Columns I and II report results using logQ
as the performance measure. Columns III and IV report results using ROA. For each
performance measure, we estimate the empirical model in equations (3) to (5) in the
text. We use the same control variables as in Tables 2 to 4. All data are described
in Table 1 and the Appendix. The estimation period is 1992-1999. All regressions
include year effects and 2-digit SIC industry dummies. The estimations correct the
error structure for heteroskedasdicity and within-Þrm correlation using the Huber-
White estimator. The bottom row reports an estimate of the correlation between the
error terms of equations (3) and (4) in the text. The P-value is from a Wald test of
the independence of equations. t-stats (in parentheses).
Dependent Variable
logQ ROA
Indep. Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV)
FounderCEO 0.436*** 0.383*** 3.579*** 2.514***
(5.42) (4.53) (3.76) (2.78)
ln(assets) −0.022 −0.023 −0.507** −0.460**
(−1.01) (−1.08) (−2.17) (−2.02)
ln(age) −0.028 −0.028 −0.430 −0.439
(−1.03) (−1.04) (−1.50) (−1.57)
V olatility −0.936*** −1.012*** −16.521*** −17.265***
(−5.19) (−5.73) (−7.28) (−7.83)
CEO ownership . 1.293*** . 19.907***
(2.84) (3.27)
CEO tenure . −0.002 . −0.013
(−0.83) (−0.50)
CEO equity pay . 0.150*** . 0.919
(2.89) (1.54)
Observations 2128 2128 2128 2128
Correlation estimate −0.395*** −0.397*** −0.121*** −0.112**
P-value ind. eqs. 0.0002 0.0003 0.0052 0.0123
***,**,* indicate statistical signiÞcance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Table 6: Probit Estimates of Founder-CEO Succession
In this table we examine the effect of lagged performance on the likelihood that a
founder retains the CEO title. We restrict our sample to Þrms that were run by one
of their founders in any year in our sample. The dependent variable (Stepout) is a
dummy which takes the value of 1 in the Þrm-years in which a founder-CEO steps out
and is 0 otherwise. For each Þrm that has experienced a change of command in this
restricted sample, we leave out all observations in the years after the one in which the
founder has relinquished the CEO title. Columns I and III report results using logQ
as the performance measure, and Columns II and IV report results using ROA. The
variable highQ is a dummy which is equal to one if the average of the Þrst two lags of
Q is at the top quartile of the Q distribution in any Þrm-year, and is zero otherwise.
The variable lowQ is a dummy which is equal to one if the average of the Þrst two
lags of Q is at the bottom quartile of the Q distribution in any Þrm-year, and is zero
otherwise. The variables highROA and lowROA are constructed in the same way.
LaggedQ and laggedROA are the averages of the Þrst two lags of each performance
variable. All data are described in Table 1. The estimation period is 1992-1999.
All regressions include year effects. The estimations correct the error structure for
heteroskedasdicity using the Huber-White estimator. z-stats (in parentheses).
Dependent Variable: Stepout
Indep. Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV)
HighQ 0.117 . 0.594 .
(0.67) (1.48)
LowQ 0.311 . 0.426 .
(1.22) (1.56)
HighROA . 0.472* . 0.862**
(2.48) (2.32)
LowROA . 0.723*** . 0.719***
(3.38) (3.21)
LaggedQ ∗HighQ . . −0.180 .
(−1.32)
LaggedQ ∗ LowQ . . −1.892 .
(-1.13)
LaggedROA ∗HighROA . . . −0.014
(−1.19)
LaggedROA ∗ LowROA . . . −0.002
(−0.21)
Observations 459 466 459 466
***,**,* indicate statistical signiÞcance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Table 7: Probit Estimates of Founder-CEO Succession with Ownership Con-
trols
In this table we examine the effect of ownership controls on the likelihood that a
founder retains the CEO title. We add lagged ownership and two interaction terms
between ownership and performance to the speciÞcation in column II of Table 6. We
deÞne an indicator variable called highOWNERSHIP which takes the value of 1 if
lagged ownership is above 0.05. The estimation period is 1992-1999. All regressions
include year effects. The estimations correct the error structure for heteroskedasdicity
using the Huber-White estimator. z-stats (in parentheses).
Dependent Variable:
Stepout
Indep. Variables (I) (II)
HighROA 0.514*** 0.562***
(2.62) (2.59)
LowROA 0.663*** 0.554**
(3.02) (2.19)
Lagged Ownership −2.308* −2.243
(−1.89) (−1.34)
HighOWNERSHIP ∗ highROA . −0.151
(−0.44)
HighOWNERSHIP ∗ lowROA . 0.356
(0.94)
Observations 461 461
***,**,* indicate statistical signiÞcance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
